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ABSTRACT
ADVISOR-INDUCED DEMAND AND MORAL HAZARD
IN THE THIRD-PARTY PAYER SYSTEM
by David Chandler Thomas

Health-care consumption in the United States has risen from 5.2% in 1960 to
17.8% of 2009 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) creating a burden that will soon be too
heavy for the economy to bear. This paper proposes that the primary accelerants of
health-care expenditures result from the third-party payer system that emerged in the
1950s. These corporate benefits and government subsidies, when overlaid on the
traditional health-care model, have led to sustained increases in the production,
recommendation, and consumption of health care while magnifying the moral hazard
problem inherent in health insurance.
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1. THE PROBLEM

Health-care consumption in the United States has increased from 5.2% in 1960 to
17.8% of 2009 Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This does not fully reflect the more than
833% per capita increase in terms of real dollars1, because average household income has
been increasing at the same time (US DHHS 2010). The rising cost of health care is
becoming a burden too heavy for employers, federal and state governments, and
individuals to bear.
From different sides of the debate, the blame for rising expenditures has been, at
various times and by various groups, placed on the shoulders of insurance companies,
health-care providers, trial lawyers, drug companies, and the very government attempting
to solve the problem.
Economists, while generally not pointing the finger of blame, propose a wide
variety of causal factors for the rising expenditures, including tax-induced corporate
subsidies and innovation (Henderson 2002), informational asymmetries and supplierinduced demand (Mitchell and Sass 1995), retrospective insurance mechanisms
(Weisbrod 1991), increasing inefficiencies from bureaucratic administration (Friedman
1992), heavy regulations and structural distortions (Goldhill 2009), medical licensing
restrictions and pricing practices (Feldstein 1981) (Arrow 1963), and the selection of
inefficient procedures (J. P. Newhouse 1996). While these proposals reflect much of
1

Health-care expenditures, as referenced in this report, are shown as 2005 dollars in per capita
amounts. The 1960 per capita health-care expenditures of $789.81 dollars rose to $7,368.60 dollars in
2009—an increase of 833%. Per capita GDP grew over the same period in 2005 dollars from $15,203.55 in
1960 to $41,310.90 in 2009—an increase of 172%.
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what is wrong with the current health-care system, they do not fully explain either the
fifty years of increases in health-care expenditures or the dramatic increases in the
incidence of high-risk health conditions over the same period.
Working from the assumption that participants in the health-care system are
rational in pursuing their self-interests, this paper proposes that the primary accelerants of
health-care expenditures result from the third-party payer system that emerged in the
1950s. These corporate and government subsidized health-care benefits, when overlaid
on the traditional health-care triad of patient, primary physician, and service provider,
encourage advisor-induced demand, leading to sustained increases in the production,
recommendation, and consumption of health-care products and services while
magnifying the existing moral hazard problem inherent in health insurance.

2

2. BACKGROUND

Health care, before the twentieth century, operated on the relatively simple
economic model shown in Figure 1. Patients relied on their primary-care physician to act
as a trusted advisor that diagnosed, recommended, and in most cases performed any
necessary medical procedures. The asymmetric information problem, arising from the
complexity of medical science, existed on a reduced scale since much of the medical
technology of today did not exist until the second half of the twentieth century. Because
payment flowed directly from the patient to the health-care provider, demand for services
operated on a downward sloping curve, albeit an inelastic one (Ringel, et al. 2000). The
limited services and high out-of-pocket costs increased inelasticity by encouraging
families to pursue home remedies until the services for a physician became critical.

Figure 1

Traditional Health-Care Economic Model
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The health-care system began to change with the introduction of significant
medical technologies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The need to
manage the rise of unpredictable health-care costs was partly responsible for the
formation and growth of large numbers of mutual aid societies. These mostly fraternal
orders allowed members to pool risk, and relied on social pressure to minimize the side
effects of the asymmetric information problem. The mutual aid societies began to decline
with the introduction of social security in 1935 (Beito 2000).
As the development of new high-cost medical treatments increased, so did the
demand for health insurance. Like traditional insurance products, the initial incarnations
covered only those procedures that were expensive and unpredictable. This model of
insurance, portrayed in Figure 2, was efficient because insurance companies had to select
the combination of coverage, patient out-of-pocket, and premiums that would maximize
profitability. Of course, they did their best to address the problems of adverse selection2
and moral hazard3 by instituting waiting periods, ex-ante medical exams, and high
deductibles or co-payments.

2

Adverse selection in health care describes the positive correlation between the demand for health
insurance and the risk of loss. Taking advantage of asymmetric information about their medical condition,
patients are able to under-pay for coverage. In other words, patients with a higher likelihood of making a
claim are more inclined to purchase health insurance and withhold information on the level of risk to avoid
paying higher premiums. Insurance companies attempt to address adverse selection by restricting coverage
on pre-existing conditions, by requiring a health examination and medical background check prior to
approval, or by accepting only large groups that have 100% group coverage.
3
Moral hazard is in play when patients are convinced that the side effects of a risky lifestyle are
less likely to affect their pocketbooks, thus increasing the likelihood they will engage in behaviors such as
over-eating, exercising less, or eating unhealthy foods. Insurance companies traditionally rely on three
mechanisms to address moral hazard: patient deductibles—the higher the deductible, the more the patient
shares in the upfront risk; co-insurance, where the patient shares in a percentage of the cost and risk; and
restricting coverage for claims that can result from certain high-risk behavior.
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Figure 2

Catastrophic Health-Care Economic Model

The changes in the health-care system that led to the sustained increases in the
levels of health-care consumption and medical prices began during World War II. The
ramp-up of military production created a greater scarcity of labor and materials needed to
produce non-war goods and services, putting pressure on employers to increase wages
and prices. To keep reported inflation under control, the federal government ordered a
wage and price freeze, making it even more difficult for employers to hire or retain
workers and meet the market demand for goods. Operating under the wage freeze,
American businesses uncovered a legal loophole that allowed them to offer in-kind wage
increases by providing subsidized health-care benefits to their employees. The
government ordered a second wage freeze to address inflation during the Korean War.
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Again, employers enticed workers with medical coverage, and many companies, not
previously providing the benefit, felt competitive pressure to offer it following the war.
Because of the tax savings, companies kept the benefits in place when the freeze
ended (Scofea 1994). The Internal Revenue Service became aware of the loophole and
attempted to tax the insurance benefit as post-tax wages until Congress, responding to the
protestations of business and employees, codified the pre-tax status of the benefit.
Except for a brief respite, provided by the 1964 Johnson-Kennedy and 1981 Reagan tax
cuts, the marginal tax rate rose in the second half of the twentieth century, further
increasing the value of health-care insurance as a pre-tax benefit (Henderson 2002).
To implement health-care benefits, employers contracted with the existing
medical insurance companies to manage the reimbursement of medical expenses on their
behalf. Thus was born the third-party payer system, which has grown to become a
massive industry. Today, the top ten insurance providers generate $280 billion dollars in
annual revenues and more than $12.5 billion dollars in net annual profits (Fortune
Magazine 2011).
In 1966, the federal government introduced Medicaid, a state-administered
subsidy for qualifying low-income families, and Medicare, a federal subsidy for senior
citizens, both modeled after the private sector health-care insurance system and
subsidized by a tax on working Americans. Drug coverage became part of Medicare
benefits in 2004 during the George W. Bush administration.
In an effort to address the lack of appropriate pricing signals in the third-party
payer system, the U.S. Congress authorized the use of Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) in
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2003 as pre-tax savings generally linked to a high-deductible insurance plan. Owned and
typically funded by the employee, an HSA allows the owner to build up a tax-free savings
account to pay directly for health-care expenses not covered by insurance. Any unused
portion of an HSA rolls over to future years and employment, ultimately converting into a
retirement account (Glied and Remler 2005).
The Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress passed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Health Care Act of 2010, mandating universal and partiallysubsidized health insurance as an effort to halt runaway health-care costs. Republicans,
the business community, and many health-care professionals objected to the use of
mandates and expanded government intrusion in health care. The Obama
administration’s push for this legislation was, in fact, one of the factors that energized the
Tea Party movement. By early 2011, more than half the states had filed actions in federal
court to have all or part of the act declared unconstitutional. At the writing of this paper,
the economic and social impacts as well as the future legal status of the act are unknown.
Today, U.S. health-care insurance relies on the third-party payer system to
reimburse health-care providers for both insurable and uninsurable claims including most
catastrophic, emergent, and routine procedures, as reflected in Figure 3. In this thesis,
catastrophic or insurable events refer to medical conditions that are high-cost and
unforeseen; emergent describes conditions that require paramedic, ambulance, or
emergency-room services; while routine encompasses low-cost chronic, ambulatory, and
urgent care.

7

Figure 3

Current Health-Care Economic Model

Consider the analogy of homeowners insurance. Most homeowners are willing to
purchase insurance to deal with the catastrophic financial impact of acts of God and man
that can cost thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars, and threaten life and
savings—including fire, flood, theft, wind, and, in some cases, earthquakes.
Homeowners rely on local fire and police departments, usually financed by property
taxes, to address the emergent impact of both acts. Homeowners do not expect their
insurance to reimburse for routine wear-and-tear such as plumbing repairs, carpet
cleaning, or replacing burned out light bulbs. What we currently call “health insurance”
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covers the medical equivalent of tornado damage, a 911 call to report an intruder, and the
fee to have a plumber unclog a toilet.
Primarily an employer-provided benefit or government subsidy, the third-party
payer system currently negotiates group rates and reimburses health-care providers for
most medical procedures. The third-party payer system is now the health-care industry
standard and provides subtle but powerful incentives that affect the behavior of each
participant in the health-care system. Understanding these incentives is essential to
discovering the underlying causes of the rising health-care expenditures.

9

3. INCENTIVES

The adoption of the third-party payer system has altered the incentives of the
participants in the health-care system. The inefficiencies of the incentive structure
become fully apparent when the overall impact on prices and the level of health-care
consumption is considered. The following portrays the incentives and behavior of each
participant, in the context of a pending healthy childbirth.
The Patient. Deemed a non-insurable event before the passage of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), normal pregnancy and childbirth were not covered by
most health insurance policies. The PDA amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
require employers to include coverage for normal pregnancy and childbirth in their health
plans (Lapidus 1983). With pregnancy and childbirth subsidized by the government or
by her employer, the mother-to-be follows the recommendations of her obstetrician for
diagnostics, office visits, pharmaceuticals, and other services. Most prospective mothers
will seek whatever health services they consider necessary, plus those recommended by
their physician. If the expecting patient does not have to pay for more than a small
deductible or co-payment for medical services, much of the financial restraint on demand
for care is eliminated.
The Medical Advisor. Although the obstetrician is primarily motivated to provide
for the needs of the patient, two indirect financial incentives also encourage the physician
to over-prescribe medical services. First, the negotiated in-network reimbursement rates
of insurance coverage have eroded the income of the medical practice, encouraging
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physicians to triage patients to specialists and diagnostic centers in an effort to increase
the number of patients seen and diagnosed during office hours. Second, as new
diagnostics, drugs, and treatments gain mainstream acceptance, physicians feel compelled
to prescribe the new services to minimize malpractice exposure (Kessler and McClellan
1996). These two incentives encourage the promotion of more diagnostics,
pharmaceuticals, and other services than is economically efficient. The doctor sees no
downside to over-prescribing, but a significant downside for under-prescribing, and the
patient has little financial incentive to push back against the recommendations for
multiple ultrasounds, an amniocentesis test, or an epidural to manage the pain of labor.
The Health-care Service Provider. Health-care service providers have both
financial and liability incentives to accept and treat any insured patient sent by a
recommending physician even if they consider the services excessive. Hospitals, testing
labs, radiology facilities, and other health-care service providers rely on the
recommendation of the primary-care physician or specialist to maintain a steady revenue
stream. It is essential to their long-term viability that they continually invest in the latest
technologies, both to remain competitive and to limit legal liability.
The Product and Service Supplier. The firms that develop and produce
pharmaceuticals, epidural and ultrasound equipment, and other medical innovations are
incentivized to engage in research and development to meet the growing demand for
improvements to health care. Once the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
independent research and testing have deemed a new breakthrough safe, and even
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marginally effective, the medical profession is pressured by both ethics and potential
liability to embrace the new offering.
The Insurance Company. Whether for-profit or not-for-profit, the insurance
company must cover its costs and return a reasonable margin to remain in business. The
insurance company adjusts the annual premiums to the employer or government to cover
cost increases tied to any new services, ensuring that future profitability is unaffected. To
manage costs during the premium year, insurers negotiate rates with a network of service
providers, agreeing to reimburse a discounted amount or percentage of normal billing
rates. For service providers outside the network, the coverage is normally limited to a
percentage of fees or a fixed amount per procedure with the patient responsible for any
remaining balance. In-network providers bill patients lacking health insurance at the full
rate to avoid any further discounts on reimbursements from the insurance companies.
This is an important business practice for the insurance company because not only does it
reduce their reimbursement costs, but also the contrast between full retail and the network
discounts increases consumer demand for medical insurance.
The Employer. There are at least two incentives for employers to provide health
insurance coverage in the workplace. First, with more than 87% of all private insurance
subsidized by employers, those workplaces that fail to offer insurance benefits could
suffer competitively (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Second, the tax deductibility of health
benefits provides a way to increase employee compensation without incurring additional
social security and Medicare/Medicaid costs (Henderson 2002).
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The Government. The government intervenes in the health-care industry in
response to both public choice and ideological incentives. First, the powerful health-care
industry engages in rent seeking by routing millions of dollars to K Street lobbyists, who
then seek to influence legislation that will benefit the industry. Second, associations
representing the powerful voting block of retired persons pressure legislatures to increase
health-care benefits for their members (Simantov, Schoen and Bruegman 2001). Third,
the growth of the “ideology of dependence” has convinced many voters and government
officials that government redistribution of wealth is not only desirable, but also essential
(Twight 2002).
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4. RISING PRICES AND CONSUMPTION

From an accounting perspective, there are only two possible explanations for
rising health-care expenditures. First, the real price level of medical services and
products has been increasing over the past 50 years. Second, patients have been
consuming a larger quantity of health-care services. Equation 1 expresses this
relationship—where CH represents total health-care expenditures, PH is the price-level of
health-care products and services, and QH the quantity of health-care consumed.

CH = PH QH
Equation 1

Price and Quantity on Expenditures

Using data extracted from several U.S. Government sources and applying this
equation, the values for total expenditures were derived for the years 1960 to 2009. Total
expenditures are broken down by the impact of change in the price level vs. change in per
capita quantity consumed. Results are displayed as a graph in Figure 4 (U.S. Department
of Labor 2011) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources 2009) (US DHHS
2010) (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). All numbers are per capita and in 2005 dollars.
While the health-care price level over the period has increased by 66%, the total increase
in expenditures of 833% is mostly attributable to the 462% increase in the quantity of
health care consumed. If the rising price level is overstated because of increased quality
through the injection of technology improvements, the level of consumption could be
even higher than stated (J. P. Newhouse 1992).
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Sources: National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and Source of Funds 1960-2009.
Spreadsheet, Washington: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010. U.S.
Department of Labor. Consumper Price Index. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2011, 24-October.
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#data (accessed 2011, 24-October).

Figure 4

Changes in Consumption and Price Level

Several historical factors might have influenced the increase in health-care prices
shown in Figure 4. One possible factor is an increase in demand resulting from
decreasing patient out-of-pocket costs and rising per capita income (Feldstein 1981)
(Henderson 2002). A second factor might be an artificial restriction on the supply of
licensed physicians by the American Medical Association and medical schools (Arrow
1963). Finally, prices might be increasing because of the development of new
technologies that improve the quality or reduce the risk of existing procedures (J. P.
Newhouse 1992).
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4.1. The Impact of Insurance Subsidies
With increasing employer and government health-care subsidies, the average
patient’s out-of-pocket costs and financial risk have declined, encouraging higher levels
of consumption and therefore driving up prices. The charts in Figure 5 show the decline
of out-of-pocket expenditures from 64% in 1960 to only 14% in 2009, with employers
and government subsidizing the difference.

Figure 5

Decline in Out-of-Pocket Expense

To explain the economic impact of the subsidy on consumption and pricing, we
consider the supply-and-demand graph for health care shown in Figure 6, where point A
represents the equilibrium for the price of health care (P1) and the quantity (Q1) of health
care consumed before the introduction of the insurance subsidy.
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Figure 6

Supply and Demand for Health Care

As the employer or government assumes more of the cost for health care, the
price to the patient drops to the out-of-pocket price (P2), increasing quantity demanded
from point A to point B. Health-care providers raise prices (P3) to match the new
quantity demanded on the supply curve shown by point C. This higher price, less the
patient out-of-pocket, is the amount paid by the third-party payer and financed by the
employer or government. The rectangle represented by Points P3, C, B, P2 on the graph
is the subsidy, and the area P1, A, B, P2 is the in-kind compensation to the patient in the
form of health-care benefits. The area represented by Points P3, C, A, P1 is the healthcare service provider gain from the subsidy, and area A, B, C represents the dead-weight
loss created by the subsidy.
Economists have argued that the gradual decline in patient out-of-pocket costs can
explain the sustained increases in both consumption and prices (Henderson 2002). Since
17

direct patient demand for health care is normally inelastic, it does not fully explain the
increasing health-care expenditures. This is because direct patient demand has three
built-in constraints. First, a visit to the doctor incurs the cost of a disruption to daily life;
second, the patient is often responsible for an insurance deductible or co-pay; and third,
the demand for health care is naturally inelastic (Koc 2004). Additional growth in healthcare consumption results from the asymmetric information problem that allows medical
advisors and suppliers to induce additional patient demand. The empirical data supports
this contention, showing very little increase over time in the number of patient-driven
procedures, such as office calls, compared to the dramatic increase in procedures induced
by medical advisors and suppliers. Table 4-1 provides an example comparing the growth
in the number of patient-initiated adolescent psychiatric office visits with the number of
physician-induced psychotropic prescriptions (Thomas, et al. 2006). From 1994-1995 to
2000-2001, the number of office visits, adjusted for population growth, increased by
18.6%, while the number of physician-induced prescriptions per office visit grew by
161.6%.

Table 4-1

Visits
Visits with Prescription Per 1000

Increased Prescriptions vs. Office Visits
1994-1995

1996-1997

1998-1999

2000-2001

%

15,837,717

18,506,174

18,623,674

18,778,811

18.6

54.2

68.3

89.5

141.8

161.6

Source: "Trends in the Use of Psychotropic Medications Among Adolescents,
1994 to 2001." Psychiatric Services, 2006
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4.2. The Impact of Medical Licensing
The medical profession’s restrictions on licensing have been blamed for limiting
the supply of physicians, resulting in higher health-care prices (Henderson 2002) (Arrow
1963). While the data show that between 2000 and 2009 the number of practicing
physicians decreased in absolute terms from 313,180 to 301,330 and by 11.8% per capita,
physician income also decreased in real dollars over the same period (U.S. Census
Bureau 2010). At the same time, the decreasing percentage of patient out-of-pocket costs
increased the demand for health care. The reduction in physician incomes appears
inconsistent with a shrinking supply of physicians and a growing demand for health care.
Another explanation for the decline in the number of physicians is that the drop in
real physician income has reduced the demand for medical degrees (Sloan 1971). In the
current system, physicians are price-takers—dependent on insurance providers, as pricemakers, to set the level of reimbursement, which results in downward pressure on the
profitability of practicing medicine. The reduction in the rate of reimbursement results in
lower profitability and explains the decrease in the number of physicians and the increase
in the ratio of assistants and nurse practitioners to physician. Lower reimbursement rates
encourage physicians to reduce the time they spend personally diagnosing and treating
each patient to increase the volume of patients treated and therefore the number of
billable procedures per hour. In other words, if a doctor spends a fraction of the time
with each patient, he is able to address an increase in demand while minimizing the
impact of the reduction in fees on his gross income. The same explanation might also
account for the growth of the practice of outsourcing to specialists and diagnostic service
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providers. Table 4-2 shows the ratio of health-care workers to physicians in 2000 and
2009, indicating 28.5% more health-care workers per physician over the period. This
effect does not in itself explain the sustained increases in health-care prices since the use
of lower-cost personnel to perform tasks on behalf of the physician should decrease
rather than increase prices.

Table 4-2

Health-Care Workers Per 100,000 Population
2000

2009

% Change

Physicians

111

98

-11.8%

Registered Nurses

781

840

7.6%

Aides and Assistants

879

1068

21.6%

Technicians

369

433

17.3%

Therapists

138

174

26%

Total Non Physicians (NP)

2685

3046

13.5%

24 to 1

31 to 1

28.5%

Ratio NP to Physician

Source: U. S. Census Bureau (2010)

4.3. The Impact of Quality Improvements from Technology
It is difficult to determine real price trends in health care because the quality of
health-care services has increased dramatically with the introduction of new technologies
that are often bundled with traditional services. If we evaluate the component cost of
individual procedures, we can better determine if the increases in the overall price level
are from rising prices or increasing use of technology. The graph in Figure 7 shows the
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average real dollar reimbursement to surgeons performing four types of surgeries from
1960 to the current decade (Hoballah, et al. 2008). The data provide support for the
argument that the injection of new technology and not inflation of the price of existing
health-care products and services is the primary factor affecting the price level of health
care.

Figure 7

Physician Reimbursements

The reimbursement rates in 2006 dollars, shown in Figure 7, represent only the
amounts paid to the surgeons for conducting the surgery, and do not include the ancillary
costs of other services that, combined, would cause the overall cost of the procedures to
be higher. These supporting services are effectively health-care consumption increases,
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for either quality improvements or defensive practices to protect the physician and
hospital from legal liability.

4.4. Growth in Health-care Consumption
In addition to the increases in the price level of health care, the graph in Figure 4
shows the impact of the rising level of the quantity of consumption on overall health-care
expenditures. Economic variables that could influence the quantity of consumption
include: increases in health-care subsidies, an aging population, growth in income (GDP),
and the adoption of new technology. The following case studies provide evidence of the
rise in overall health-care consumption.
One group looked at the increased usage of epidurals on patients covered by
Medicare for the periods 2002 and 2006. In Table 4-3, the number of epidural
procedures increased at a rate of 59.9%, while the physician fees for the service increased
just 7% in real dollars. The results of the study appear to uphold the hypothesis that
expenditures are rising because of increased consumption (Manchikanti, et al. 2010).

Table 4-3

Epidurals Performed
Physician Charges

Incidents and Fees of Epidurals
2002

2006

% Increase

1,181,080

1,888,140

59.9

$100.50

$107.50

7.0

Source: "Analysis of the Growth of Epidural Injections and Costs in the Medicare Population”, Pain
Physician Journal 2010
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Another study looked at the increased use of psychotropic prescriptions on
adolescent patients for the period 1994 to 2001. Results shown in Table 4-4 are in real
dollars, and are weighted for changes in population. The percentage of visits leading to a
prescription increased by 161.6%, indicating a higher trend in the consumption of
psychotropic drugs (Thomas, et al. 2006).

Table 4-4

Increased Use of Psychotropic Drugs

1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001
Psychotropic* Prescriptions
982,606
1,296,831
1,741,471
2,866,103
Visits with Prescription Per 1000
54.2
68.3
89.5
141.8
Source: "Trends in the Use of Psychotropic Medications Among Adolescents,
1994 to 2001." Psychiatric Services, 2006.
*Psychotropic drugs cross the blood–brain barrier and act on the central nervous system.
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%
Increase
191.7
161.6

5. ADVISOR-INDUCED DEMAND

Before the twentieth century, the primary-care physician often filled both the role
of medical advisor and service provider (Beito 2000). This model is common in virtually
all professional service industries, including legal services, tax and auditing services, auto
maintenance, and, of course, health care. An asymmetric information problem exists in
these professions because of the complex nature of diagnosing and addressing legal
issues, accounting errors, engine problems, and medical conditions. The client or patient
is rationally ignorant because few people have the time or inclination to learn all that is
necessary to perform these tasks effectively when the alternative of certified
professionals is readily available. An adage from the legal profession says it all: “A man
who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client.” The use of trusted advisors in
complex professions has existed for centuries, suggesting that it is the most economically
efficient approach to the asymmetric information problem (Arrow 1963). The minimal
changes in per capita legal, accounting, and auto repair expenditures suggest that, ceteris
peribus, health-care expenditures would have followed suit.
Taking advantage of the informational asymmetries inherent in health care,
physicians, like all professional service providers, have a financial incentive to foist
economically inefficient procedures on unwitting patients. To counteract this problem of
supplier-induced demand, insurance companies often require pre-approval, managed care
groups require the authorization of an assigned agent physician, and patients rely on the
integrity of their primary-care physician for recommendation to specialists. Although
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supplier-induced demand occurs in health care, it was more problematic before the
increase in specialists, when a physician serving as both medical advisor and service
provider benefited directly from over-prescribing. An auto mechanic who both
recommends and performs an engine rebuild has a different incentive than one who
diagnoses the problem and recommends that a consumer seek out an independent repair
facility.
Advisor-induced demand is the more likely culprit behind the increasing
consumption in the current health-care system. Primary-care physicians, attempting to
consider the patient’s best interest, recommend what they believe is the maximum level
of affordable care. However, because of corporate benefits and government subsidies,
what is “affordable” has expanded beyond what the patient would accept if directly
responsible for the cost. In addition, while attempting to provide appropriate professional
advice to each patient, per the Hippocratic oath, a doctor must consider the risk of a
malpractice lawsuit. In other words, physicians are incentivized to practice defensive
medicine by over-prescribing tests, drugs, and treatments.
To explain the sustained increases in consumption we have seen over the past
fifty years, we must consider how a patient interacts with her physician as a trusted
advisor. Health-care consumption normally begins when a patient schedules an office
visit with her primary-care physician. The patient assumes her doctor will act as a trusted
advisor, has the skills and knowledge to diagnose and treat her condition, and can
marshal the necessary resources (Dranove 2000). Most physicians attempt to do these
things while minimizing malpractice liability. Once the patient is in the exam room, the
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doctor’s incentives encourage recommending all appropriate diagnostics, medical
treatments, and pharmaceuticals available, restrained financially only by the patient’s outof-pocket and insurance coverage. The existence of the insurance subsidy encourages
advisor-induced demand, shifting the patient demand curve to the right, thus encouraging
health-care suppliers to invest in the research and development of even more medical
technologies. Health-care innovation grew dramatically after the introduction of the
third-party payer system in response to the growing advisor-induced demand and the
growth of per capita GDP. The graph in Figure 8 shows the number of major
breakthroughs for the first and second halves of the twentieth century, broken down by
treatment, diagnostic, and preventive innovations.

Figure 8

Medical Technology Breakthroughs
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The number of major treatment technology breakthroughs in the second half of
the century increased by 111%; new preventive technologies by 150%; and diagnostic
innovations by 500% (U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources 2009). The
number of innovations reflects the level of new products and services, but not the level of
consumption of the new technologies. Statistics from three of the most widely acclaimed
diagnostic breakthroughs indicate dramatic increases in consumption. The average
number of emergency room patients receiving MRI/CT/PET scans rose from 13 per 100
persons in 1996 to 58 in 2007, a 346% increase over the ten-year period (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Resources 2009). The percentage of adult women
receiving bi-annual mammograms rose from 24% in 1987 to over 68% in 2007 (National
Cancer Institute 2010). The number of colonoscopy procedures performed in ambulatory
visits increased from 677 per 10,000 visits in 1996 to 1,778 in 2006, rising 163% over the
decade (U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources 2009).
In summary, health-care subsidies have not only increased patient demand for
health care, they have altered the patient/physician relationship by allowing for increased
levels of advisor-induced demand. In turn, advisor-induced demand serves as an
incentive for the development of a never-ending stream of new and potentially inefficient
medical innovations, further increasing both the number of new medical procedures and
the cost of existing medical services.
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6. MORAL HAZARD AND HEALTH RISKS

Economists and insurance actuaries understand that insurance products are
inherently susceptible to moral hazard. If patients are convinced that risky lifestyle
choices are less likely to affect their pocketbooks, they are more likely to engage in highrisk behaviors such as over-eating, exercising less, or eating unhealthy foods. Insurance
companies traditionally rely on three mechanisms to address moral hazard: (1) patient
deductibles—the higher the deductible, the more the patient shares in the upfront risk; (2)
co-insurance, where the patient shares in a percentage of the cost and risk; and, (3)
restricting coverage for claims that can result from high-risk behavior.
Before the introduction of the third-party payer system, high out-of-pocket costs
for routine health care served as a kind of “super” deductible for catastrophic health
insurance because the same behaviors that increase the occurrence of common health
problems often increase the risk of catastrophic conditions. Obesity, for example,
increases the likelihood of health conditions that require routine care such as “diabetes,
hypertension, osteoarthritis, chronic back pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, urinary
incontinence, gastroesophageal reflux disorder, gallstones, and asthma.” Over time,
obesity dramatically increases the likelihood of the catastrophic conditions of heart
failure and stroke (Frankenburg and Zanarini 2006). If patients have to cover the cost of
treating the lesser ailments, they are more likely to alter their lifestyle, thus reducing the
likelihood of the catastrophic problems as well.
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A case study of obesity illustrates the impact of health-care subsidies on the level
of moral hazard. Obese patients spend more on health care than those that are physically
fit, and the number of obese is increasing, as shown in Table 6-1. These results show that
over the twenty years from 1987 to 2007, the percentage of the U.S. population
categorized as obese grew from 13% to 28%––an increase of 115%. At the same time,
per capita health-care expenditures for the obese grew 111% in 2005 dollars, almost
twice that of the non-obese population (Duchovny and Baker 2010). These results
provide support for the contention that the subsidized third-party payer system increases
the level of moral hazard when combined with traditional catastrophic health insurance.

Table 6-1

Weight Category
Underweight*
Normal
Overweight
Obese
Morbidly Obese*
All Categories

Obesity and Health-Care Spending1

Share of Adult
Population (%)
1987
2007
4
2
52
35
31
35
12
24
1
4
100
100

%
Chg
-50%
-33%
13%
100%
300%

Spending per Adult
(2009 dollars)
1987
2007
$3,230
$4,970
$2,440
$4,030
$2,650
$4,260
$2,640
$5,330
$2,530
$7,010
$2,560
$4,550

%
Chg
54%
65%
61%
102%
177%

* Sample sizes for underweight and morbidly obese are too small to be statistically significant.
Source: Congressional Budget Office, “How Does Obesity in Adults Affect Spending on Health
Care?” 2010.

The data indicate that in 1987 the spending per adult for normal weight compared
to morbidly obese was $2,440 to $2,530, a spread of only 8%. In 2007, the spending per
adult for normal weight to morbidly obese was $4,030 to $7,010, a difference of 74%.
The growth in health-care expenditures on the obese and morbidly obese suggests that
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significantly more procedures and technology are being deployed for their care, while the
growth in the number suffering from obesity might be explained by the low patient cost
of maintaining the high-risk life style.
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7. THE COST OF LIFE EXPECTANCY

A common argument for maintaining the health-care status quo is that the high
cost of U.S. health care is justified because life expectancy is increasing with the level of
expenditures (Shang and Goldman 2008). While addressing the issue in this paper is
important, it is difficult to prove a causal relationship between U.S. health-care
expenditures and life expectancy. Many other factors, such as the reduction in the
number of smokers (Stewart, Cutler and Rosen 2009), the introduction of mandatory
automobile safety devices (Cummins, et al. 2011), and 911 emergency services (Athey
and Stern 2002) have played a role in the life expectancy increases we have experienced
since the 1960s (Lichtenberg 2011). Extending life expectancy is not the only incentive
for spending more on health care. Along with the rise in per capita income, the desire to
improve the quality of life has increased in importance. The evidence for this can be seen
in the growth of cosmetic surgery and the increasing number of new massage therapists
(U.S. Department of Labor 2011). Given these qualifiers, the return on life expectancy is
an important factor to consider.
The World Health Organization (WHO) tracks life expectancy information for
most nations, and reports a significant positive correlation between life expectancy and
expenditures on health care. The data shown in the Appendix is based on the Healthy
Adult Life Expectancy (HALE) method of computing life expectancy, which estimates
the years of healthy life expectancy by subtracting the years of ill health from total life
expectancy (World Health Organization 2010).
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The data also show that the 2007 level of U.S. health-care expenditures is 2.2
standard deviations above the mean, as shown in Figure 9, suggesting that health-care
consumption in the U.S. is highly inefficient when measured against life expectancy
(World Health Organization 2009).

Source: World Health Organization: World Health Statistics 2009
The data in this graph does not include any statistics from African or island nations to
remove the distortions for HIV epidemics and the above average per capita levels of
infrastructure health-care costs for small island nations.

Figure 9

Life Expectancy and GDP for Developed Nations

To move the U.S. to the global mean would require either a 60% reduction in
expenditures or a fifteen-year increase in life expectancy. The ratio of U.S. health care to
GDP from 1960, which sits on the global mean, provides a point of comparison. Even if
we assume there is a direct correlation between life expectancy in the U.S. and the
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increases in health-care expenditures, the graph presents a gloomy picture of the return on
per capita health-care costs. While extending life expectancy is desirable, if we continue
to see increases in real cost, the ratio of expenditures to life expectancy, and the
percentage of GDP consumed by health care, the existing system will collapse.
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8. BREAKING THE CYCLE

The sustained increases in medical expenditures follow an unbroken cycle that
suggests health care will continue to consume more and more of GDP unless something
changes. The following steps make up the cycle of sustained increases.

1. Employer/government provides subsidized health-care coverage for
more of the population.
2. Patient experiences symptoms and meets with primary physician.
3. After initial evaluation, physician recommends appropriate procedures,
medications, and services, including new products and services
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the
medical industry.
4. Patient pays for out-of-pocket costs, if applicable, and the health-care
service provider bills the insurance carrier for services.
5. Insurance reimburses the health-care service provider for acceptable
procedures at agreed-upon rates.
6. Insurance company adjusts the premium to employer. Government
increases taxes or deficit spending to cover increases in expenditures.
7. Repeat
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To address the increasing health-care expenditure problem in the U.S., it will be
necessary to reduce consumption to an efficient level. There are only two ways to
accomplish this: first, by forming large and costly bureaucracies to coerce citizens into
consuming less health care; or second, by letting Americans continue to choose how
much to consume but requiring them to directly bear and pay the cost of treatment for
routine medical conditions. Canada and many countries in Europe elected for the first
option, implementing socialized medicine, which, while it has lowered consumption, did
so by reducing the level of coverage and fixing price levels, resulting in shortages and
waitlists (Oliver 2009). For the consumer choice option to succeed, health-care insurance
coverage must be limited to insurable events—putting the onus on the patient to pay
directly for all other health-care services, thus eliminating the need for the third-party
payer system and reducing the moral hazard it magnifies.
Superficially, this proposal might appear equivalent to the high-deductible plans
with optional HSAs currently offered by most insurance companies. However, a highdeductible plan is not the same as catastrophic insurance, as it provides coverage for noninsurable events once the out-of-pocket is satisfied, and HSAs remain an unpopular
option because insurance companies overprice them to compensate for the adverse
selection problem they exacerbate in traditional policies. In other words, if appropriately
priced and optional, HSA plans draw the healthiest employees, leaving the highest-risk
workers in the low-deductible plans. Average claims in the low-deductible plans then
increase because of the higher risk pool, forcing the insurance company to raise the
premiums on either the low-deductible plan or the HSA plan, ensuring that at least one of
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them is an unattractive option. Even though the profit margins for HSA plans are much
higher, the premiums are not being adjusted down accordingly. The exception to this is
where a firm chooses to offer a single HSA plan for all employees.4

4

In 2009, I was given access to the actuarial data on the various insurance plans of a leading
health-care insurance company. For obvious reasons the proprietary data is not available to the public. The
HSA plans had claims against premiums of 60% to 65% while PPO plans were averaging 80% to 85% of
premiums. If a firm selected an HSA-only option, premiums were reduced to reflect the lower level of
claims. In mixed plan offerings, the premiums for the HSA option were increased to discourage their
adoption. This is because an insurance company offering a PPO-only plan is able to combine the two risk
groups, lower the premiums, and present a more competitive PPO offering than a company presenting a
mixed offering of HSA and PPO. Since the PPO offerings are generally more advantageous to the higherrisk employees, an HSA only plan is considered less flexible and for some employees less desirable.
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9. CONCLUSIONS

Health-care subsidies by the government and employers provide the incentive for
sustained increases in health-care consumption. When patients are not forced to consider
the real cost of health care, they demand more care than is efficient, and ever-helpful
physicians recommend increasing levels of diagnostics and treatments, unrestrained by
questions of expense. In addition, the third-party payer system increases the level of
moral hazard associated with health-care insurance, encouraging risky behavior and
further driving up demand.
Eliminating the routine-care subsidy will not correct every problem in health care.
The cost of developing and testing new drugs will be problematic as long as the Food and
Drug Administration operates at its current level of inefficiency (Philipson and Sun
2008). Catastrophic insurance will continue to suffer from the adverse selection problem,
fueling the debate over the need for some form of universal or mandated coverage.
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APPENDIX - 2007 HEALTH-CARE COSTS TO LIFE EXPECTANCY

% of GDP
On Health Care
10.1
8.7
10
5.3
4.6
6.9
11
10.6
9.5
3.6
7.5
8
8.1
2.2
6.6
9.4
2
4.4
6.4
5.3
8.4
9.2
10.8
3.5
2.5
8.2
15.3
4.9

Country
Argentina
Australia
Canada
Chile
China
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Greece
India
Ireland
Israel
Japan
Kuwait
Mexico
Netherlands
Pakistan
Peru
Republic of Korea
Russian Federation
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States of America
Venezuela

Source: World Health Organization, “World Health Statistics 2009”
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HALE Life
Expectancy
67
74
73
70
66
70
73
73
72
56
73
73
76
69
67
73
55
67
71
60
74
74
75
62
68
72
70
66
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